CRIMINAL JURISDICTION BEYOND BORDERS: UNIVERSAL JURISIDICTION AND TERRORISM: ANALYZING THE LOCKERBIE BOMBING TRIAL AND THE AL-MIHDHAR AND AL-HAZMI
Subject: Universalisation of Jurisdiction Under International Law (LW: 5711)
ABSTRACT
The paper explores into the perplexing terrain of recognizing and prosecuting terrorism, emphasizing its elusive nature across international borders. Terrorism’s varied definition among nations and groups highlights the difficulty in reaching a global understanding. Historical examination indicates parallels between current techniques and state combat, emphasizing the importance of socio-political circumstances. While universal jurisdiction has been broadened to fight impunity for serious crimes like as terrorism, jurisdictional loopholes remain, allowing perpetrators to avoid punishment. Politics greatly influences the United States’ approach to terrorism, limiting agreement on its definition and management. Due to competing interests and power dynamics, international collaboration and legal standardization confront challenges. This global threat necessitates a comprehensive solution, yet cultural differences hamper the establishment of a widely recognized definition. The emergence of terrorism as a reaction to armed combat techniques influences its methods across subsequent revolutionary waves. The growth of universal jurisdiction, originally intended at countering piracy and now embracing a variety of serious crimes, has encountered difficulties in detecting state-sponsored terrorism and coordinating judicial systems. Non-state actors who challenge standard state-centric paradigms make accountability under international law difficult. Counterterrorism initiatives promote civil liberties and the rule of law, recognizing the relevance of democratic ideals. Despite periodic advances in international law to define and combat terrorism, disconnected approaches make effective prevention and punishment difficult. Case studies such as Chhun Yasith v. Thailand highlight the difficulties of implementing international law, highlighting geopolitical considerations and post-9/11 judicial challenges. Regional cooperation initiatives, as well as the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, work to improve counterterrorism measures. However, due to ambiguity and varying settings, defining terrorism within a legal framework remains problematic. Resolutions, treaties, and accords emphasize the importance of international cooperation but rely on member countries’ active participation. The representation of various sorts of assaults in the media impacts public views and anxieties. Critical legal cases like as the Al-Mihdhar and Al-Hazmi 9/11 and Lockerbie bombing trials highlight the complexity of jurisdiction, sovereign immunity, and the delicate international coordination required to prosecute terrorism suspects.
KEYWORDS: International Borders, Universal Jurisdiction, Countr-Terrorism, International Collaboration, Media Representatives, Sovereign Immunity.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Integrating the debate over universal jurisdiction and the prosecution of terrorist activities within the framework of historical terrorism sheds light on the shifting nature of terrorist tactics. The historical context of the anarchist movement in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, which aimed to destabilize political structures by targeted violence, provides as a basis for understanding contemporary arguments on terrorism (Rapoport, 2004; Laqueur, 2007).
The topic of whether international tribunals, such as the ICC, should treat terrorist actions using universal jurisdiction remains significant in modern legal debates. Several experts, like Luz E. Nagle and Win-Chiat Lee, stress the importance of a clear, universally acknowledged definition under international law in order to successfully combat terrorism. Lee particularly pushes for terrorism to be classified as a crime under universal jurisdiction, highlighting comparisons between terrorism and other crimes and putting light on the special issues that terrorism poses (Nagle; Lee).
Madeline Morris’ book digs at the difficulties that the ICC has while dealing with terrorism cases. It shows tensions between national courts and the ICC’s engagement, particularly worries about high-ranking officials’ impunity and the UN Security Council’s growing role (Morris).
Pablo Antonio Fernández-Sánchez investigates countries’ use of customary law to prosecute worldwide terrorism cases. Regardless of potential political consequences, this strategy, endorsed tacitly by international treaties and used by national courts such as Spain’s, emphasizes the significance of addressing serious crimes (Fernández-Sánchez).
Valerie Paulet’s Universal Jurisdiction Annual Review highlights serious concerns regarding classifying transnational crimes as acts of terrorism, emphasizing the need of distinguishing international crimes for the sake of universal jurisdiction and human rights. This is consistent with the Norwegian Supreme Court’s judgment in favor of universal jurisdiction for terrorist offenses, which broadens the scope of prosecution for international terrorism (Paulet).
Finally, UN Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001) represents a critical commitment by member states to combat terrorism, highlighting the use of universal jurisdiction for terrorist-related offenses and indicating a worldwide agreement in confronting this danger (UN Security Council Resolution 1373).
Incorporating current legal debates into the historical context of early terrorism illuminates the ongoing issues and complexities in defining, prosecuting, and countering terrorism within the scope of international law and jurisdiction
1. INTRODUCTION
The notion of universal jurisdiction in dealing with acts of terrorism on a worldwide scale is based on principles of international law[1]. It gives governments the ability to prosecute people suspected of serious crimes even if they have no direct ties to the prosecuting state. Terrorism is a big menace that crosses boundaries and threatens worldwide peace in the modern world. Despite its pervasiveness in debate, the concept of terrorism remains difficult and disputed. Different nations and organizations[2] provide different definitions informed by their viewpoints, interests, and experiences. Understanding the historical evolution of the notion of terrorism is critical. From its early definitions[3] to its present expressions, it has developed. Nations and international organizations have contributed to a patchwork of ideas about what defines terrorism. These differences have a substantial influence on how different actors perceive and respond to terrorist attacks. When governments perceive acts of violence differently, classifying them as terrorism or insurgency, problems arise. This ambiguity affects international counter-terrorism operations by blurring the line between terrorism and other types of violence. These discrepancies are frequently influenced by political objectives and power relations, impacting legal consequences and complicating prosecution. The representation of the media and public opinion also add to the complexity by impacting public debate and policy actions. International institutions, notably the United Nations[4], are critical in combating terrorism on a worldwide basis. However, reaching an agreement on a universal definition remains difficult. Efforts are being made via resolutions, conventions, and accords[5] to define and combat terrorism, but attaining a complete understanding is proving difficult. Understanding rising trends and developing definitions is critical for the future. To define and combat terrorism, worldwide collaboration is required. In an increasingly complicated environment, achieving clarity and consensus is critical. The lack of a broadly agreed-upon definition raises considerable legal issues. It has an impact on the legal prosecution of accused terrorists and makes international collaboration more difficult. The uncertainty generated by differing definitions makes identifying and convicting individuals engaging in terrorist activity difficult. To address these issues, international legal systems must strive for a more uniform concept of terrorism. Harmonizing terminology across states and organizations would allow for more effective legal procedures and improve international collaboration in the fight against terrorism. Furthermore, legal clarity would diminish terrorist groups’ capacity to exploit uncertainty for their ends, bolstering global counterterrorism operations[6].
2. HISTORICAL STANCE ON TERRORISM
In recent times, the growth of contemporary terrorism frequently followed the techniques adopted by nations in armed wars. There was a debate around a century ago that terrorist targeting codes were similar to military ones, indicating a separation between soldiers and civilians. However, with the growth of industrialized armament beginning in the mid-nineteenth century, targeting grew more indiscriminate and fatal, especially during the two world wars, where the idea of identifying targets was frequently ignored. David Rapoport’s thesis of “waves” [7]of terrorism has been used to construct current terrorist techniques, which are considered a recourse to revolutionary violence. Each wave, such as the anarchist or anti-colonial waves, has a particular set of strategic objectives and methods. Because returning demobilized soldiers were well-trained in the use of force, these waves frequently copied techniques from state warfare. The emergence and fall of terrorist groups within these waves were determined by their capacity to incite opposition, resolve grievances, or oppose political concerns. This demonstrates the importance of social and political cultures in shaping terrorism and its motivations. Terrorism has always followed the methods of countries engaged in conflict. Terrorists used to distinguish between troops and civilians when selecting targets over a century ago, just like military standards did. However, as weaponry improved in the mid-1800s, aiming became less precise and more deadly. This disdain for specific targets grew much more prominent throughout the twentieth century’s main conflicts when discriminating between targets was not a priority. These wars, termed “total wars,” impacted some people who went on to become post-war terrorists. They used what they learned from these large-scale confrontations and used unusual weaponry and tactics, such as fighting in towns. Terrorism is still employing strong and widespread destructive instruments like bombs and other weapons of mass destruction nowadays.
2.1 Historical Events Impact on Universal Jurisdiction Today
There has been a considerable change in emphasis over the last forty years toward crimes committed on board aircraft[8]. With the significant expansion in international air travel, there was an increase in criminal activity within flights, including the creation of ‘air rage’ in the late twentieth century. Aircraft were not merely a location for criminal activity, but also a target in and of themselves, as the sad events of September 11, 2001[9], demonstrated. However, because air travel involves a large number of people in a confined area traversing several nations’ airspace, planes, passengers, and pilots are vulnerable to criminal and terrorist actions. The notion of linking terrorism with commonly recognized grave crimes raises several difficulties. Terrorist groups with worldwide networks and assistance in many countries, such as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)[10], offer considerable obstacles. Their presence and efforts in Colombia[11] to promote terrorism raise problems about how the international community defines terrorism and the ramifications for global justice. Given ICC jurisdiction over non-party nationals[12], they say that when a crime occurs on the territory of a state party to the ICC, the ICC’s jurisdiction extends to non-party nationals. The premise behind this expansion is that the state where the crime occurred delegated its geographical authority to the ICC. Simply put, if a state can pursue crimes committed within its boundaries, it also has the authority to delegate that jurisdiction to an international court. If the ICC Treaty[13] is amended to include terrorist crimes other than genocide, war crimes, or crimes against humanity, pursuing these additional charges may face more serious limits than prosecuting present ICC crimes. In addition to the current limits relating to jurisdictional structure, complementarity, and immunities influencing prosecution for existing crimes[14], an additional significant limitation will apply to offences created by an amendment to the ICC Treaty.
2.1.1 Expanding Universal Jurisdiction: Accountability Beyond Border
As a result of the recognition of significant crimes whose offenders might easily elude punishment, universal criminal jurisdiction[15] progressively evolved. Because of the nature of the acts and the difficulties in apprehending pirates, piracy was the first such crime, allowing all nations to prosecute. The same logic underpins the current expansion of universal jurisdiction over war crimes, genocide, torture, and acts of international terrorism. Genocide and state-sponsored terrorism[16] are usually committed by high-ranking officials who shelter themselves and their subordinates from national judicial processes. Individuals in powerful positions frequently shelter war criminals and torturers, making it difficult for national courts to punish them. For example, no Iraqi court could or did punish Saddam Hussein or his security personnel for their crimes while he was still in power. Similarly, some nations provide foreign terrorists with sanctuary by refusing to prosecute or extradite them to the countries where they committed atrocities. For example, despite his conviction in the United States, Osama bin Laden was given haven by the Taliban authority in Afghanistan.
2.1.2 Emerging Political Notion on Jurisdiction
International politics has a significant impact on domestic politics in a variety of ways. Trade treaties, foreign aid[17], and other comparable issues frequently ignite intense arguments in home venues. While many studies investigate how international politics generate difficulties that must be resolved through domestic institutions, few investigate how international politics directly impact domestic politics. Nonetheless, it is plausible to believe that the global political environment has a systematic influence on domestic politics. Understanding the emergence and fall of communist parties, for example, frequently entails taking into account the worldwide environment. Furthermore, while these impacts may be minor, they are considerable. The election in Spain in 2004[18] is a good example of this, voters’ reactions to various sorts of terrorism, whether global or domestic, might differ. Initially, Spanish officials blamed the Madrid rail line explosion on ETA, a Basque separatist group[19]. However, the attack did not follow ETA’s usual tactics, instead resembled Al-Qaeda’s. If Al-Qaeda was found to be involved, the ruling People’s Party, which backed the Iraq war, was likely to face political backlash. They may profit, on the other hand, if ETA was the perpetrator, given their strong position against the group, whilst the Socialists were viewed as more sympathetic towards ETA (van Biezen, 2005). As a result, many people suspected the government of distorting or concealing facts, or of utilizing the attack to achieve political advantage. This case demonstrated how the importance of a terrorist strike was strongly impacted by the parties’ previous policies and actions. There are two major coalition-building theories[20]: those oriented on politicians’ office-related incentives and those centred on their policy preferences. The office-related method forecasts the formation of minimal winning coalitions, whereas the policy-focused approach forecasts coalitions formed by ideologically linked parties.
3. INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS: CHANGING DYNAMICS GLOBALLY
According to current US State Department figures, worldwide terrorism has decreased to a 25-year low[21]. There were 665 reported acts of international terrorism in 1987[22], which has decreased to fewer instances by 1996. While this may appear to be a good trend, it is important to emphasize that the numerical drop does not completely represent the widespread impact of international terrorism. Despite these apparent gains, global terrorism continues to impose significant human, political, and economic costs on foreign policy and security.[23] Incidents such as the 1988 bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, attacks on US personnel in Dharan in 1996, assassination attempts on former President Bush[24] and Egyptian President Mubarek[25], and other attacks in the Middle East highlight the far-reaching implications of these crimes. Such occurrences create far more harm than can be measured statistically. The purpose of this essay is to demonstrate that worldwide terrorism of this extent demands broader support and attention, going beyond the limitations of specific terrorist groups that are often addressed in scholarly and media debates. The disagreement over how to define international terrorism has persisted. Developing countries typically push for the exclusion of activities connected to self-determination, perceiving such actions as measures to help national liberation or freedom from foreign rule. They claim that such objectives are consistent with ideals enshrined in the UN Charter and other legal sources.Western governments, on the other hand, adopt a different attitude, claiming that the uncertainty surrounding self-determination movements leads to a double standard. They feel that this uncertainty gives legitimacy to violent acts committed by groups they support. This debate has hampered the development of a comprehensive international legal definition of terrorism.
3.1 State-Sponsored Terrorism
The term “state-sponsored terrorism”[26] is often used in political discourse to refer to a wide variety of behaviours, from actively carrying out terrorist attacks to supporting, promoting, or tolerating terrorism on a global scale. However, there is no universal opinion on its definition or nature within the field of international law. This section seeks to fulfil three goals:
a) First, it attempts to trace the key efforts aimed at developing a comprehensive legal definition of international terrorism and to investigate the complications that have made this work difficult.
b) Second, it tries to investigate why efforts to develop a legal definition have predominantly focused on micro-level terrorism while ignoring macro-level or state-sponsored terrorism, as well as the legal control consequences of this prioritization.
c) Third, it is critical to establish these limits and provide a clear frame of reference. It aids in distinguishing the activities for which a state may be held liable or involved in supporting or financing terrorism on a global scale.
The League of Nations sought to define “terrorism” in a treaty as early as 1937[27]. Terrorism was defined as illegal activities directed toward a state with the intent of instilling fear in specific persons, groups, or the broader public. However, this pact was never implemented and quickly became obsolete. Thirty-five years later, a US-led campaign to draft another pact was launched, prompted in part by the kidnapping and murder of many Olympic participants in Munich[28]. However, this plan experienced similar difficulties and did not completely materialize.
3.1.1 Non-State Actors’ Evolving Impact
As the notion of the state as a unitary entity grows more complex, the impact of Non-State Actors on social concerns, particularly security, becomes more apparent. Non-State Actors range from NGOs[29], charities, political parties, and lobby groups to the media, multinational corporations, powerful individuals such as ‘oligarchs,’ and even terrorist groups, international crime syndicates, diasporas, and organized ethnic minorities. Given this vast range of players, many of whom are linked to state authorities, establishing and assessing their influence on state authority provides a significant difficulty. Due to the abundance of wide and ambiguous definitions in the literature, defining Non-State Actors has proven difficult. One potentially useful method is to contrast these actors with the characteristics normally associated with a state. To begin, Non-State Actors do not often exercise official influence over a population, despite the fact that many have their own constituencies, membership bases[30], workers (in the case of companies and NGOs), and supporters. Some, such as ethnically defined political parties, may even formally represent certain populations within a country. As a result, certain Non-State Actors can wield immense power, perhaps exceeding that of a state. Second, Non-State Actors often lack formal territorial authority[31], while there are exceptions, such as separatist movements, major companies, or even organizations such as the Catholic Church that effectively administer particular territory. States, on the other hand, may not necessarily have authority over all territories within their jurisdiction, as demonstrated in locations such as Pakistan’s tribal areas.
Finally, the conventional idea of international relations being largely between states is under scrutiny. Many non-governmental organizations (NGOs) now have standing in interstate bodies and can enter into agreements with state authorities. Furthermore, authorities are increasingly engaging in formally sanctioned contracts with private firms, such as Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs)[32]. As a result, Non-State Actors are playing more important roles under international law. The UN Global Compact (2000)[33], for example, brings together governments and multinational corporations to advocate for ethical business practices, demonstrating the growing responsibilities of Non-State Actors in the worldwide environment.
3.1.2 Counter-Terrorism and Counter-Insurgency
Counterterrorism is a difficult undertaking, especially in democratic democracies. There is no one-size-fits-all method for dealing with terrorism in democracies, according to Paul Wilkinson[34], because each circumstance is unique. Wilkinson, along with Louise Richardson[35], emphasizes the importance of civil rights and the rule of law in counterterrorism strategies. While these ideas are consistent with democratic norms, they serve as guiding principles rather than a comprehensive counterterrorism plan. Numerous studies have been conducted to investigate effective counterinsurgency methods. David Galula, a former Lieutenant Colonel in the French army, is widely regarded as a pioneer in this subject. Key techniques were addressed in his book “Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice” (1964)[36]. Galula prioritized gaining local people’s support, providing strong administration, and keeping security in recovered territories from rebels. He also emphasized the significance of dealing with any lingering components of armed insurgency organizations. These concepts served as the foundation for nations such as the United States and the United Kingdom to formulate and apply their counterinsurgency tactics. These ideas underpin General Petraeus’s “clear, hold, and build” approach.
4. TERRORISM AND UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION
4.1 Historical Background: Assassinations of 1934
Following the killings of Yugoslav King Alexander I and French Prime Minister Louis Barthou in 1934, the League of Nations[37] set about developing international legal guidelines to prevent terrorist actions. The League’s expert committee prepared two conventions in 1937: one for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism and another for the Establishment of an International Criminal Court[38]. Even though only India ratified the former and none ratified the latter, the League’s approach was comprehensive and consistent. It aspired to establish substantive laws and ensure their fair and consistent application through an international tribunal.
4.1.1 Aut Dedere Aut Judicare and UN’s Adoption of Nuremburg Principles
According to the treaties, a contracting party might submit the accused to the International Criminal Court for trial if it opted not to prosecute them locally or allow extradition, following the concept of aut dedere aut judicare[39].When the United Nations began developing the Nuremberg principles[40], it adopted a paradigm similar to the Mandate for Persecution and Security case. Another section of the General Assembly began work on the law for an International Criminal Court (ICC)[41]. The Draft Code covered a wide range of topics, including Nuremberg crimes, genocide, and even a section on terrorism. Both proposals, however, met a similar fate: their consideration was postponed in 1957 and again in 1968 until the Assembly completed its work on defining aggression.
4.1.2 UN’s Draft Code and Coverage on Terrorism
Following the adoption of the Draft Code, the UN’s anti-terrorism operations[42] were reactive to events, resulting in an incremental approach. This piecemeal approach was seen in numerous hijacking treaties, draft provisions on Crimes Against Diplomatic Agents, and the US Draft Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Certain Acts of International Terrorism presented to the General Assembly in 1972[43]. Unfortunately, the latter effort faltered in the Sixth Committee, diving into the complex problem of the core causes of terrorism and then disappearing. This disjointed approach may not result in a complete framework for preventing and punishing terrorist activity. Without a tribunal to provide coherence and consistency to different international agreements, national courts’ implementation may fall short of assuring clarity and impartiality. In contrast to the UN’s event-driven approach, an unofficial organization, The Foundation for the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, has focused on studying terrorism within the broader framework of the League and the Draft Code of Offences against the Peace and Security of Mankind. The Foundation continued in developing a treaty on international crimes and a law for an international criminal court.
5. CASE STUDY: ANALYZING “TERRORISM” DEFINITION VARIABILITY
The International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, which was ratified on December 9, 1999, has explicit clauses that define terrorism categorically, the clause states that[44]:
“A breach of the Convention occurs when an individual, directly or indirectly, offers or gathers money with the intent or knowledge that they will be used, in whole or in part, to carry out violations outlined in the treaties mentioned in the Convention’s appendix. This also includes any act intended to inflict death or serious harm to those who are not participating in an armed conflict to intimidate a population or coerce a government or international organization.
Furthermore, an offence is committed whenever someone attempts, assists as an accomplice organizes, leads, or participates in such conduct for a common objective. It is important to note that the actual use of cash to carry out this illegal conduct is not required for the activity to be regarded as an infraction. This offence applies regardless of whether the funds were used for the prohibited conduct. The Convention, however, excludes acts that lack international components as described in its wording.”
Each Party to the Convention is obligated to establish appropriate procedures for identifying, freezing, seizing, or confiscating any monies intended for or used in the commission of the stated offences following its domestic legal framework.
These offences are considered extraditable crimes under the Convention, and Parties are required to establish jurisdiction over these offences, impose appropriate penalties, apprehend alleged offenders, prosecute or extradite them, cooperate in preventive actions and responses, and exchange necessary information and evidence for related criminal proceedings. Furthermore, the offences defined in the Convention are considered extraditable between Parties under both pre-existing extradition treaties and the Convention itself.
5.1 Case Study: Chhun Yasith v. Thailand (ASEAN, 2005): The 1999 Phnom Penh riots, staged by Yasith Chhun’s Cambodian Freedom Fighters (CFF)[45], marked a difficult moment in Cambodian history. The assaults, which included grenade blasts, were motivated by personal vendettas and political rivalries and attempted to disrupt Prime Minister Hun Sen’s administration. Personal history and ideological grievances against suspected corruption drove Chhun’s metamorphosis from a professional to a revolutionary leader. His effort to gain assistance among Cambodian Americans, Operation Volcano, failed due to unorganized attacks. Chhun’s risky journey to the United States, following arrest in 2005, and final conviction in 2010 highlighted problems about international law, geopolitical factors, and post-9/11 judicial difficulties.
5.1.1 The Dynamics of Counter-Terrorism in the Americas and South East Asia: Challenges and Collaborative Efforts
The Inter-American Committee Against Terrorism (CICTE), established in 1999, strengthened the OAS’s involvement in security issues[46]. This group promotes collaboration in the fight against terrorism by providing a forum for national authorities to discuss information sharing, training activities, crisis management, border cooperation, and travel documentation security measures. It also seeks to promote universal adherence to international counter-terrorism treaties. The implementation of chemical weapons regulations shows variable but overall good development. However, when it comes to biological weapons restrictions, the situation in South-East Asia ranges from weak to non-existent[47]. According to information from 1540 reports and INTERPOL’s Bioterrorism Unit[48], there have been little legislative moves made to implement bioterrorism rules. Several nations, including Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand, have admitted that they have loopholes in their WMD restrictions, acknowledging that extant domestic rules predate Resolution 1540[49]. Malaysia is contemplating enacting legislation to strengthen the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC)[50]. This legislative gap is a common concern throughout Southeast Asia, forcing the 1540 Committee to require frequent reporting on actions made to close it. Concerns regarding implementing nuclear safeguards remain unsolved in the context of nuclear and radiological material controls. Small Quantity Protocols (SQPs)[51] exclude states including Brunei, Cambodia, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Myanmar, and Singapore from providing information on their nuclear material to the IAEA[52] as long as amounts remain below set thresholds. Despite their commitments under SQP agreements and Resolution 1540, few of these governments with SQPs have a State System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material (SSAC). Singapore is the only Southeast Asian country with a SQP that has signed the Additional Protocol[53], which requires compliance with enhanced SQP standards announced in 2005. Cambodia, among these states, has signed the CPPNM, agreeing to enact domestic laws to safeguard nuclear material on its territory[54]. Through collaboration with the IAEA and US efforts, Indonesia and the Philippines have made significant progress in improving their SSACs (State system of accounting for and control of nuclear material). As Indonesia embarks on its nuclear energy program, strengthening these controls becomes critical, posing issues for Thailand and Vietnam as they follow suit. CICTE[55] (Inter-American Committee against terrorism) is now involved in the development of programs in eight different disciplines. Airport security, customs and border protection, cybersecurity, anti-terrorism legislation, port security, combating terrorist funding, participating in terrorism policy exercises, and improving tourism security are among the activities covered. In general, Latin American governments have worked with the United States and other Western powers[56] to develop counter-terrorism policies. While each country operates within its own conceptual and legal framework, with Colombia “being the only one fully aligned with the framework introduced by the United States following the September 11, 2001 attacks, there is agreement on the need to pool resources and learn from more developed countries in combating terrorism”.
In particular, the 3+1 Security Group[57], comprised of Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and the United States, has aggressively worked to improve the capabilities of these three Latin American countries. Their primary goal is to counter cross-border criminal activity, money laundering, and potential terrorist fundraising attempts. Terrorist networks aren’t very visible in the Western hemisphere; at the time of writing, there were no operating cells of Islamic terrorists in the region. However, there are pockets of ideological sympathizers and facilitators throughout South America and the Caribbean who offer financial, logistical, and spiritual support to Middle Eastern groups designated by the US as terrorist organizations. The Tri-Border Area, which includes Puerto Iguaz, Argentina, Foz do Iguaçu, Brazil, and Ciudad del Este, Paraguay, is infamous for its lawlessness and the existence of terrorist-supporting activities. Smugglers, drug traffickers, gun dealers, and organized criminal groups have long called this region home. The coexistence of multiple illegal enterprises and illicit marketplaces with legitimate economic pursuits is exacerbated by political corruption. Northern Chile, particularly in Iquique, Maicao in Colombia near the Venezuelan border, Margarita Island in Venezuela, and Panama’s Colon Free Trade Zone[58] are also of concern. Furthermore, domestic terrorist action poses a more substantial threat, notably in Colombia and Peru.
5.1.2 United Nations and the Global Counterterrorism Strategy
The United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy is a one-of-a-kind global tool for enhancing national, regional, and international efforts to combat terrorism. Its unanimous approval in 2006 represents all United Nations Member States’ collective agreement[59] on a unified strategy and operational approach to counter-terrorism.
This Strategy underscores Member States’ main responsibility for implementing and combating terrorism and violent extremism conducive to terrorism. It highlights the categorical condemnation of terrorism in all its manifestations, as well as the Member States’ commitment to implementing tangible and coordinated steps to prevent and combat terrorism, both individually and collectively. These initiatives cover a wide range of topics, from strengthening Member States’ counter-terrorism capabilities to better coordinating the United Nations System’s numerous counter-terrorism efforts.
The United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, issued as a Resolution with an accompanying Plan of Action[60], is built on four pillars:
1. Addressing the variables that contribute to the spread of terrorism.
2. Terrorism prevention and combat.
3. Increasing states’ capacity to prevent and battle terrorism while strengthening the UN system’s responsibility in this area.
4. As the cornerstone of the battle against terrorism, ensuring the fundamental values of human rights and the rule of law are protected.
6. EVOLUTION AND CONTENTION SURROUNDING THE LEGAL CONCEPT OF TERRORISM: UN RESOLUTIONS AND SCHOLARLY PERSPECTIVES
From 1954 until 1998, the International Law Commission (ILC) made periodic attempts to define international crimes[61] following the re-emergence of the idea of terrorism. During this time, there was a substantial shift in the perception of terrorism, which was increasingly associated with state support rather than being primarily ascribed to non-state actors. The International Law Commission (ILC) mentioned terrorism without offering a clear definition in 1954, categorizing it as illegal aggression involving one state against another. Following that, in 1991, it proposed an international terrorism crime between nations, describing it as:
“undertaking, organizing, assisting, financing, encouraging or tolerating acts against another State directed at persons or property and of such a nature as to create a state of terror in the minds of public figures, groups of persons or the general public.”
An important question emerges here: can terrorism work successfully as a legal concept? Several scholars have expressed reservations, claiming that using terrorism as a legal framework is impractical and achieves no final legal goal. Rosalyn Higgins is among those who argue that “terrorism is a legal oxymoron.” It is just a handy way of referring to behaviours that are generally condemned and in which either the techniques employed are illegal, or the targets are protected, or both” (Higgins, 1997). Terrorism, according to Louise Richardson, “has become so widely used in many contexts as to become almost meaningless” (Richardson, 1999). Richard Baxter agrees, expressing sadness that “a legal concept of ‘terrorism’ was ever inflicted upon us.” “The term is imprecise, ambiguous, and, most importantly, it serves no functional legal purpose” (Baxter, 1974)[62].
Numerous resolutions from the General Assembly and Security Council have addressed terrorism inside the UN system. In this regard, UN General Assembly Resolution 49/60 (steps to end international terrorism)[63] deserves special emphasis. This resolution described actions that were deemed “terrorist” in nature. The United Nations defined terrorism as “acts intended or calculated to provoke a state of terror in the general public, a group of persons, or particular persons for political purposes that are in any circumstance unjustifiable, regardless of the considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious, or any other nature that may be invoked to justify them” (UN General Assembly). Furthermore, this resolution highlighted the importance of continued development and formalization of anti-terrorism principles (UN General Assembly). However, despite its unanimous ratification, the Resolution’s lack of binding power substantially impeded its intended results.
The goal of UN Security Council Resolution 1566 (2004)[64] was to define terrorism in terms of risks to international peace and security generated by terrorist attacks. Terrorism, according to this Resolution, is defined as illegal acts committed against people with the purpose of killing, inflicting grievous bodily injury, or taking hostages. The fundamental goal of these crimes is to instill fear in the broader public, a group of people, or specific individuals. terrorist also aims to frighten a population or compel a government or international organization to engage in or refrain from certain activities that fit under the crimes established by international terrorist agreements and protocols. Furthermore, the Security Council categorically condemns all kinds of terrorism as unacceptable under any circumstances and indefensible by any political, philosophical, intellectual, racial, ethnic, religious, or similar reasons. This Resolution calls on all states to adopt preventative measures against such actions and, if they cannot be prevented, to guarantee their prosecution with penalties commensurate with their gravity. Unlike the General Assembly’s decision, decision 1566 has a legally binding effect because it was approved under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, underlining its required character in terms of implementation by member states.
6.1 Resolutions, Conventions, and Agreements
a) Resolution: A/RES/59/290 – International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism The International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism attempts to combat nuclear terrorism[65] by creating procedures for prosecuting, extraditing, and punishing those implicated in nuclear-related acts. It promotes international cooperation by requiring nations to prohibit specific behaviours, such as the possession or use of radioactive materials with the intent to harm. Parties are also required by the treaty to maintain the security of nuclear facilities and materials within their territories. It also encourages reciprocal legal cooperation and extradition for those implicated in nuclear terrorist actions.
b) Resolution: A/RES/51/210 – Declaration to Supplement the 1994 Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism
The Declaration to Addendum the 1994 Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism, Resolution A/RES/51/210[66], is an addendum to the 1994 declaration. It highlights the need for international collaboration in battling terrorism, asking governments to undertake counter-terrorism measures. The resolution emphasizes the significance of complying with international terrorist treaties and procedures. Furthermore, it asks for enhanced efforts to address the core causes of terrorism and encourages governments to promote discussion and collaboration to combat this global menace.
c) Resolution: A/RES/49/60 – Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism
The Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism, A/RES/49/60, adopted on December 9, 1994[67], emphasizes the importance of combating international terrorism. It highlights member nations’ commitment to preventing and eliminating terrorist activity through a variety of means. The resolution emphasizes the necessity of adhering to international terrorism agreements and protocols and encourages governments to strengthen cooperation in law enforcement, information sharing, and extradition processes to successfully address terrorist threats. Furthermore, it advocates for tackling the root causes of terrorism and fostering international collaboration to combat this worldwide threat.
6.1.1 Visual Culture, Political Exposure, and Public Perceptions of Terrorism
TV news stations place a high value on “visual culture”[68] in their broadcasts, emphasizing stories having significant audiovisual content. The amount of audiovisual content available has a direct impact on the amount of coverage provided to a certain news event. Narrative or audio-only stories are sometimes overlooked in favor of those with more visual components. This approach has a substantial influence on prospective attack planning, driving terrorists to target areas that would draw quick media attention owing to their relevance or visibility. In recent years, various types of mass violence have become common topics of news coverage and political debate. According to my findings, there is a link between selective exposure to partisan mass media and the type of respondents’ worries. New Hampshire Public Radio (NHPR) listeners were more anxious about mass shootings, but Conservative Talk Radio (CTR) listeners were more concerned about prospective terrorist strikes[69]. Even after taking into account the individuals’ backgrounds and past political convictions, this pattern continued. Furthermore, individuals who often watched WMUR’s nonpartisan local TV news indicated heightened concern about mass shootings but not necessarily terrorist strikes.
If public anxiety was entirely based on the brutality of these episodes, there would be no statistically significant difference between reported fear of a terrorist attack and dread of a mass shooting. The differences identified across political lines, which are exacerbated by exposure to partisan media, imply that terror perception is impacted not only by the violence itself but also by interactions with societal institutions. This suggests that categorizing an occurrence as a “Terrorist Attack” versus a “Mass Shooting” elicits different meanings, images, and dangers for responders.
Television news operates under stringent time limits, attempting to distill key events for viewers into a brief style. This shortness makes in-depth analysis, historical context, and complete treatment of complicated problems difficult. As a result, educating the public about issues that directly affect their interests becomes a significant task. The public’s impression of terrorism, which is heavily influenced by audiovisual sources riddled with clichés, simplifications, and superficiality, has a significant impact on how public opinion forms calls for government action. This effect also determines the amount of leeway policymakers have. Furthermore, temporal constraints influence the media’s approach; they frequently favour attention-grabbing features, dragging out stories and exaggerating minor occurrences to sustain viewer interest while waiting for new headlines.
7. CRITICAL CASES OF TERRORISM AND DEFINING JURISDICTION
Case law judgments are crucial in creating and interpreting international law, particularly in the context of terrorism. When courts rule on terrorism-related issues, they set precedents and interpretive rules that can have a substantial impact on the development of international law and politics in this area, some of which are:
7.1 Al-Mihdhar and Al-Hazmi Lawsuit (2003)
Two of the hijackers participating in the September 11, 2001, assaults on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon were Khalid Al-Mihdhar and Nawaf Al-Hazmi[70]. Following 9/11, various investigations and inquiries were performed to determine the security flaws and intelligence failings that allowed the attacks to occur. Families of the dead and survivors launched a lawsuit against numerous institutions, including the Saudi government, saying that Saudi authorities offered assistance to the hijackers and were aware of the imminent attacks but did nothing to prevent them. The complaint also named Saudi people and organizations as defendants, accusing them of giving financial and logistical support to Al-Mihdhar, Al-Hazmi, and other hijackers. An inquiry into the FBI’s handling of intelligence relating to Khalid al-Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi, two of the hijackers engaged in the September 11 attacks.[71] It explains the FBI’s claims and actions concerning the information they had on these people before the attacks. The FBI said that they discovered Mihdhar and Hazmi were linked with al Qaeda and had entered the United States in January 2000 in late August 2001. They also discovered Mihdhar re-entered the nation on July 4, 2001, for a purported month-long visit. Following that, in late August, the FBI launched an investigation to find Mihdhar, who was still on the run at the time of the September 11 attacks. The inquiry looked at the intelligence available to the FBI and the rest of the Intelligence Community on Mihdhar and Hazmi before September 11. It concluded that there was no proof that the FBI or any other intelligence organization had specific information about the September 11th plan. The momentous court case is now at a critical stage, seven years after the original victory granted 9/11 family victims the ability to sue Saudi Arabia for their claimed participation in assisting the al Qaeda terrorists. Saudi Arabia’s legal officials in Washington, D.C., recently submitted court filings expressing their intention to urge the dismissal of the New York case by October 6. They claim that a U.S. court lacks jurisdiction to hear the multibillion-dollar case because Saudi Arabia is immune from litigation under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA)[72]. The lawsuit aimed to hold these companies accountable for their alleged involvement in the assaults, as well as financial compensation for the relatives and survivors of the victims. The case contained complex legal issues, including problems with foreign countries’ sovereign immunity and the accountability of non-state actors accused of sponsoring terrorist acts.[73] The Saudi administration has repeatedly denied any participation in the attacks and has vigorously disputed the allegations. They contended that the action should be dismissed, invoking sovereign immunity, which shields foreign governments from being sued in US courts under certain conditions.
7.2 The Lockerbie Bombing Trial (2001)
Pan Am Flight 103 tragically crashed over Lockerbie, Scotland, in 1988, killing all 243 passengers and 16 crew members on board, as well as 11 people on the ground below. This horrible plane catastrophe was not merely an accident, but also a purposeful act of violence. Following painstaking attempts to put together the wreckage of PA103, both the US and UK governments brought indictments in November 1991[74], saying that two Libyans had installed an explosive device aboard the plane, resulting in its destruction. Initially charged with murder, conspiracy to murder, and breaches of the Aviation Security Act 1982, the charges were later changed to focus primarily on murder. The trial of Abdel Baset Ali Mohmed Al-Megrahi and Al Amin Khalifa Fhimah began on May 3, 2000, in Kamp van Zeist in the Netherlands. Scotland sought jurisdiction over the lawsuit after the jet was destroyed in Scottish airspace. At the time the charges were released, the two accused were in Libya. Both the United Kingdom and the United States moved quickly to extradite them for trial. However, because neither nation has an extradition[75] treaty with Libya and is bound by local rules, the extradition request was denied. Libya claimed that the applicable convention in this case was the 1971 Montreal Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against Civil Aviation Safety. This treaty requires member countries to extradite or punish anyone suspected of terrorist acts against aeroplanes[76]. As a result, Libya claimed that it had the jurisdiction to prosecute and jail the accused. The Libyan government selected a Supreme Court justice and an examining Magistrate to draft a case against them. The United States and the United Kingdom refused to turn over evidence against the accused persons, which would have aided Libya’s prosecution attempts. Libya’s suppression of evidence may have permitted the nation to carry out its prosecution. The United Nations Security Council took an unusual step in January 1992 when it passed a resolution requesting the extradition of the accused persons[77]. In the absence of a treaty, there is usually no formal requirement to extradite persons under international law. This resolution, however, represented the Security Council’s firm stance on the issue. Following that, in March 1992, a second resolution was approved stressing Libya’s commitment to cooperate with the extradition demand. If Libya fails to meet this criteria, the resolution threatens penalties. Sanctions were placed on Libya in April 1992 as a result of its noncompliance. Another resolution in November 1993 increased these penalties, increasing the pressure on Libya to cooperate. A key breakthrough happened in April 1999, when the accused persons consented to be transferred to the custody of the United Kingdom. This collaboration resulted in the easing of Libya’s sanctions, marking a watershed moment in the long-running extradition battle.
CONCLUSION
The notion of universal jurisdiction has evolved over time, beginning with piracy and then expanding to include war crimes, genocide, torture, and acts of international terrorism. However, given the diversity of opinions and experiences among nations and organizations, the lack of a globally agreed-upon definition of terrorism creates a considerable difficulty. This complication stymies international counter-terrorism operations by interfering with legal prosecution and worldwide coordination.
Terrorism has developed throughout history, with shifting tactics, plans, and aims over many “waves” of its expression. Recent events, such as the use of aircraft as terrorist targets, have broadened the scope to include crimes committed in international airspace, further complicating the definition of terrorism and extending jurisdictional complexities, particularly in cases involving non-party nationals before the International Criminal Court (ICC). The combination of international and local politics has a considerable impact on reactions to incidences of global and domestic terrorism. State-sponsored terrorism adds levels of complication because there is no widely agreed-upon term under international law. Attempts to define terrorism frequently focus on micro-level terrorism, ignoring macro-level or state-sponsored terrorism, creating legal control and culpability attribution issues. The proliferation of non-state players in global affairs, ranging from NGOs to terrorist organizations and multinational companies, calls into question traditional notions of state power and international relations. This variability makes defining and assessing the influence of these entities on global security more difficult. Counterterrorism techniques differ depending on the circumstances, with democratic counterterrorism measures frequently stressing civil rights and the rule of law. However, the fragmented character of international methods, as well as the lack of a consistent legal framework, pose difficulties in preventing and prosecuting terrorist operations.
While regional and global programs such as the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy strive to improve information sharing, training, and crisis management, unifying language and promoting complete teamwork remain critical to effectively combating terrorism. Case law judgments, such as those in the post-9/11 Al-Mihdhar and Al-Hazmi lawsuit and the Lockerbie bombing trial, navigate complex legal issues such as sovereign immunity, the accountability of non-state actors, and the interpretation of international conventions, illuminating the complexities of prosecuting terrorist acts. Finally, the complexities of terrorism highlight the necessity for a generally agreed-upon definition, extensive legal frameworks, and more global collaboration. Balancing security imperatives with human rights and the rule of law is critical to confronting this complex global challenge successfully. The historical background, emerging approaches, and the interplay of international law, politics, and regional partnerships highlight the challenges required in comprehensively confronting terrorism.
[1] Terrorism. (2023, November 23). International Committee of the Red Cross. https://www.icrc.org/en/war-and-law/contemporary-challenges-for-ihl/terrorism A basic principle of IHL is that those engaged in an armed conflict must at all times distinguish between civilians and combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives. IHL thus prohibits deliberate or direct, as well as indiscriminate attacks on civilians or civilian structures. The use of human shields or hostage taking are similarly proscribed. When a situation of violence amounts to an armed conflict, there is little added value in calling such acts “terrorism”, because they already constitute war crimes under international humanitarian law.
[2] Memorializing the Victims of Terrorism. (2021, December 14). https://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/rp-pr/cj-jp/victim/rr09_6/p3.html In Canada, section 83.01 of the Criminal Code[1] defines terrorism as an act committed “in whole or in part for a political, religious or ideological purpose, objective or cause” with the intention of intimidating the public “…with regard to its security, including its economic security, or compelling a person, a government or a domestic or an international organization to do or to refrain from doing any act.”
[3] Definition of terrorism. (2023, November 25). Wikipedia. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Definition_of_terrorism#Etymology A 30 January 1795 use of the word ‘terrorism’ in The Times, an early appearance in English. The excerpt reads: “There exists more than one system to overthrow our liberty. Fanaticism has raised every passion; Royalism has not yet given up its hopes, and Terrorism feels bolder than ever.”
[4] International Day for the Prevention of Violent Extremism as and when Conducive to Terrorism | United Nations. (n.d.). United Nations. https://www.un.org/en/observances/prevention-extremism-when-conducive-terrorism-day In its resolution 77/243, the General Assembly decided to declare 12 February the International Day for the Prevention of Violent Extremism as and when Conducive to Terrorism, in order to raise awareness of the threats linked to violent extremism, as and when conducive to terrorism, and to enhance international cooperation in this regard.
[5] https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/Documents/Publications/Factsheet32EN.pdf the Security Council, in its resolution 1566 (2004), referred to “criminal acts, including against civilians, committed with the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury, or taking of hostages, with the purpose to provoke a state of terror in the general public or in a group of persons or particular persons, intimidate a population or compel a Government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act”.
[6] Papers – 2021 – United States Counterterrorism Operations 2018-2020 | Costs of War. (n.d.). The Costs of War. https://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/papers/2021/USCounterterrorismOperations the U.S. government conducted operations it explicitly described as counterterrorism, in an outgrowth of President George W. Bush’s “Global War on Terror.” These operations include air and drone strikes, on-the-ground combat, so-called “Section 127e” programs in which U.S. special operations forces plan and control partner force missions, military exercises in preparation for or as part of counterterrorism missions, and operations to train and assist foreign forces.
[7]https://repository.library.georgetown.edu/bitstream/handle/10822/1043900/walls_georgetown_0076m_13610.pdf?sequence=1 David C. Rapoport’s “The Four Waves of Modern Terrorism,” is one of the most influential and widely debated theories in the field of terrorism studies. Following the terrorist attacks in the United States on September 11, 2001, Rapoport created his theoretical framework for modern terrorism by grouping previously indistinguishable patterns of political violence into four distinct waves, each lasting a generation and inspired by ideologies derived from anarchism, anti-colonialism, socialism, and religious fundamentalism. Since 1979 the world has existed within the fourth “Religious” wave that will dissipate by 2025 if the generational life cycle remains constant.
[8] https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1945&context=jss n 1970-2018, there
were 1,358 terrorist incidents targeted against aviation, including 260 hijackings which accounted for the main method of attack. It is considered that the first terrorist-like act took place in Peru in 1930, when Peruvian revolutionaries hijacked an aeroplane to drop propaganda leaflets. The first aircraft hijacking after World War II took place in Macao in 1948. The practice was sporadic until 1966. In 1967, 15 aircraft hijackings were reported, and the number grew 30 in 1968.
[9] September 11 Attacks: Facts, Background & Impact | HISTORY. (2010, February 17). HISTORY. https://www.history.com/topics/21st-century/9-11-attacks On September 11, 2001, terrorists linked to the Islamic extremist group al Qaeda—founded by Osama bin Laden—hijacked four commercial passenger airplanes and carried out suicide attacks against targets in the United States. Two of the planes were flown into the World Trade Center in New York City. Within a few hours, both of the twin towers collapsed into rubble, demolishing a large section of lower Manhattan. A third plane hit the Pentagon in Arlington, Virginia, just outside Washington, D.C. The passengers and crew of the fourth plane fought back, and the plane was downed in a field near Shanksville, Pennsylvania.
[10] Crime, .,&Crime,I.(2023,November23).FARC. InSightCrime. https://insightcrime.org/colombia-organized-crime-news/farc-profile/ The FARC was the oldest and most important guerrilla group in the Western Hemisphere, and for a long time, they financed their political and military battle against the Colombian government through kidnapping, extortion, and participating in the drug trade on various levels.
[11] Crime, .,&Crime,I.(2023,November23). FARC .InSightCrime. https://insightcrime.org/colombia-organized-crime-news/farc-profile/ Although the signing of the peace agreement put an end to the FARC guerrillas, Colombia’s internal conflict is far from over. The departure of the guerrillas has resulted in the criminalization of some of their dissidents, which has generated groups similar to the BACRIM: criminal organizations that formed after the demobilization of the country’s paramilitary forces.
[12] Us, K. G. U. P. S. O. L. (2021, May 19). Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court Over Non-party States: Legitimate or Ultra Vires? JURIST – Commentary – Legal News & Commentary. https://www.jurist.org/commentary/2021/05/utkarsh-dubey-icc-jurisdiction-over-nonparty-states/ Territorial jurisdiction of a court can be understood as the geographical bounds within which a court has the power to adjudicate. Article 12 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (Statute) confers territorial jurisdiction on the International Criminal Court (ICC) in cases where “conduct in question” was committed on the territory of a state party to the Statute or by a national of a state party. However, in cases where the alleged crime took place on the territory of a state not party to the Statute, the ICC may only exercise jurisdiction if such a state willingly submits to the jurisdiction of the ICC or if the case is referred to the prosecutor by the United Nations Security Council under Article 13(b) of the Statute.
[13] Galingging, R. (n.d.). PROSECUTING ACTS OF TERRORISM AS CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY UNDER THE ICC TREATY. UI Scholars Hub. https://scholarhub.ui.ac.id/ijil/vol7/iss4/6/ Even-though terrorism is not explicitly mentioned as a crime that falls under the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court, it can however be adjudicated at the ICC by interpreting it as included in Article 7 of the Rome Statute. Article 7 of the ICC Statute can be used as a legal basis for prosecuting terrorist acts if the acts fulfill the Article’s general requirements. The text of the Rome Statute does not need to be amended in order to encompass acts of terrorism. (Article 7 Crimes against humanity For the purpose of this Statute, “crime against humanity” means any of the following acts when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack)
[14] https://www.unodc.org/e4j/zh/crime-prevention-criminal-justice/module-14/key-issues/2–the-institutional-and-functional-role-of-prosecutors_different-models-and-practices.html n several countries, with either civil law or common law systems, the prosecution service has a hierarchical structure which is headed either by the Minister of Justice (in some States the Attorney General, who is a member of the Government) or by the Prosecutor General, who is entrusted with various powers. More specifically, in some States, the Prosecutor General is appointed (and can also be removed) by the Government In Canada, for example, the decision-making function of the prosecution is independent from inappropriate political control, direction and influence. At the same time, however, since the Attorney General is fully accountable to Parliament for the prosecution function, the law ensures various measures of oversight for the exercise of prosecutorial discretion.
[15] https://www.un.org/en/ga/sixth/65/ScopeAppUniJuri_StatesComments/Kenya.pdf The preamble to the ICC Statute contains the universal jurisdiction principle: (aut
dedere aut judicare principle) which provides: ‘Affirming that the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole must not go unpunished and that their effective prosecution must be ensured by taking measures at the national level and byenhancing international cooperation’ (para. 4); (universal jurisdiction) ‘Recallingthat it is the duty of every State to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over those responsible for international crimes’ (para. 6); (principle of complementarity) ‘Emphasizing that the International Criminal Court established under this Statute shall be complementary to national criminal jurisdictions’
[16] State-Sponsored Terrorism | Encyclopedia.com. (n.d.). https://www.encyclopedia.com/books/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-and-maps/state-sponsored-terrorism The U.S. government accused Iran of being the “most active state sponsor of terrorism in 2001.” Its support took two forms. The first was direct terrorist actions planned and carried out by the Ministry of Intelligence and Security (the Iranian intelligence agency) and the Revolutionary Guard Corps (a military force formed after the revolution. The second was providing support for other fundamentalist Islamic organizations.
[17] https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0976747918802649 There are four main perspectives on the potential cost of terrorism in international trade, notably: (a) enhancement of the physical security of personnel, equipment and plant, (b) improvement of global supply chains and security in the transport of goods and services as well as risks that are associated with the disruption of sources of global supply, (c) political risk insurance, (d) hiring of security consultants and (e) reduction of direct investment and operations in high-risk areas.
[18] De Barcelona, U. A. (n.d.). The Impact of the 2004 Election on Spanish Companies. UABDivulga Barcelona Research & Innovation. https://www.uab.cat/web/news-detail/the-impact-of-the-2004-election-on-spanish-companies-1345680342044.html?articleId=1320048371532 n the last days of the electoral campaign for the 2004 general election in Spain, on Thursday March 11th 2004, a series of simultaneous terror attacks caused the death of 191 persons in commuting trains in the capital Madrid. Four days later, the opposition party PSOE won the election, against all predictions that were made prior to the terror attacks. This change in expectations presents a unique opportunity to take advantage of event study techniques (which measure the impact of surprise events on the stock market) to test some politico-economic hypotheses.
[19] Binnie, I. (2018, May 2). Basque separatist group ETA says it has “completely dissolved.” Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-spain-eta-idUSKBN1I31TP/ ETA (Euskadi Ta Askatasuna, or Basque Country and Freedom) declared a ceasefire in 2011 and handed over weapons in April 2017, bringing Western Europe’s last major armed insurgency to a close.
[20] Coalition Formation Theory | www.coalitiontheory.net. (n.d.). http://www.coalitiontheory.net/research-areas/coalition-formation-theory Coalition formation theory deals with the analysis of one or more groups of agents, called coalitions, that get together to jointly determine their actions. It is related both to cooperative and non-cooperative games, as the key concept of this theory, coalition, can be defined as a group of agents which coordinates agreements among its members, while it interacts non-cooperatively with its non-members. Although a coalition, once formed, is cooperative, its creation can take place in a non-cooperative way.
[21] https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/crt_national_consortium.pdf The total number of terrorist attacks worldwide in 2017 decreased by 23 percent and total
deaths due to terrorist attacks decreased by 27 percent, compared to 2016. While numerous
countries saw a decline in terrorist violence between 2016 and 2017, this overall trend was
largely due to dramatically fewer attacks and deaths in Iraq. Twenty-four percent of all
deaths in terrorist attacks in 2017 were perpetrator deaths, down from 26 percent in 2016.
This statistic was historically much lower but began to increase in the 2000s, largely due to
shifting tactics in Afghanistan and, to a lesser extent, in Iraq in the 2010s.
[22] https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/138653NCJRS.pdf
[23]https://www.dfat.gov.au/sites/default/files/minisite/static/4ca0813c-585e-4fe1-86eb-de665e65001a/fpwhitepaper/foreign-policy-white-paper/chapter-two-contested-world/constraints-global-growth.html Ageing populations will impede the productive capacity of economies such as Japan, China and the European Union. In response to cyclical crises, major economies have little room for stimulus because of high public debt and low official interest rates. China’s economy is also slowing as it matures and this will affect global growth rates.
[24] USDOJ/OIG FBI Labs Report. (n.d.). https://oig.justice.gov/sites/default/files/archive/special/9704a/05bush2.htm In April 1993, former President George Bush visited Kuwait to commemorate the victory over Iraq in the Persian Gulf War. During Bush’s visit, Kuwaiti authorities arrested 17 people allegedly involved in a plot to kill Bush using a car bomb.
[25] Egypt | History, Map, Flag, Population, & Facts. (2023, November 29). Encyclopedia Britannica. https://www.britannica.com/place/Egypt/The-Mubarak-regime He also released Sadat’s political prisoners, while prosecuting vigorously the Islamic militants who had plotted the late president’s assassination. Unfortunately, Egypt’s worsening economic problems could not be solved quickly. But in his very first speeches Mubarak did frankly and perceptively identify Egypt’s economic shortcomings.
[26] 1990 Global Terrorism: State-Sponsored Terrorism. (n.d.). https://irp.fas.org/threat/terror_90/sponsored.html Iraq was returned to the terrorist list in September 1990 because of its increased contact with, and support for, terrorist groups. After the formation of an international coalition against the invasion of Kuwait, Iraqi officials issued public statements endorsing terrorism as a legitimate tactic.Following its invasion of Kuwait on 2 August, the government of Iraq systematically seized the citizens of the United States and many other nations. This occurred in both Kuwait and Iraq and continued for several months. Many of the hostages were moved to strategic sites in Iraq, including armaments factories, weapons research facilities, and major military bases.
[27] K. (n.d.). Counter-Terrorism Module 4 Key Issues: Treaty-based Crimes of Terrorism. https://www.unodc.org/e4j/en/terrorism/module-4/key-issues/treaty-based-crimes-of-terrorism.html
An early attempt to agree on a universal definition of terrorism in the context of an international treaty was the 1937 Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism, which sought to define trans-boundary terrorism as an international crime. Article 1 defined acts of terrorism as “criminal acts directed against a State and intended or calculated to create a state of terror in the minds of particular persons or a group of persons or the general public”
[28] Munich Massacre – Olympics, 1972 & Definition | HISTORY. (2021, May 24). HISTORY. https://www.history.com/topics/1970s/munich-massacre-olympics eight terrorists wearing tracksuits and carrying gym bags filled with grenades and assault rifles, breached the Olympic Village at the Summer Games in Munich before dawn on September 5, 1972 Israel, meanwhile, responded with Operation Wrath of God, a covert Mossad mission to kill the masterminds behind the Munich massacre. Several suspects were assassinated in the coming months, but the mission was suspended when an innocent man was mistakenly killed in Norway in 1973. The target of that shooting, Black September Chief of Operations Ali Hassan Salameh, was assassinated by car bomb in 1979 in the operation’s final mission.
[29] Rom, M. C. (2022, May 18). 15.5 Non-state Actors: Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs) – Introduction to Political Science | OpenStax. https://openstax.org/books/introduction-political-science/pages/15-5-non-state-actors-nongovernmental-organizations-ngos Often NGOs are the result of a moral crusade of one or a small group of concerned citizens. For example, Henry Dunant founded the Red Cross in the mid-1800s to aid soldiers injured in war. Some other well-known NGOs include Doctors without Borders, Greenpeace, and the World Wildlife Fund. Some NGOs have thousands of members, while others have only a few hundred, and their budgets and scope of impact are similarly varied. The Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC), with close to 100,000 people on staff, is the largest NGO in the world.
[30] https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/Infographic_item1.pdfThe largest Constituency, ENGO, has been represented by two networks within – Climate Action Network (CAN) and Demand
Climate Justice (DCJ).
[31] https://ww3.lawschool.cornell.edu/research/ILJ/upload/Ronen-final.pdf. There is no point in holding an NSA accountable under human rights law if it does not have the capacity to formulate and execute policy. This requisite is often circumstantially linked to the previous one: in order to establish and sustain territorial control, it is often necessary to possess an organiza-tional apparatus. An NSA in effective control of territory is, therefore, likely to have such an apparatus. It is conceivable that non-state groups would maintain sufficient control over territory to remove the state’s forces with- out establishing alternative governing mechanisms, but such groups would not be bound by international human rights law.
[32] Finance and Development. (2001, September 1). Finance and Development | F&D. https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2001/09/gerrard.htm Public-private partnerships (PPPs) are generally not “privatizations” in the sense that the latter term is most commonly used. (See Box 1.) A privatized business is one that was formerly owned by the public sector and is now owned by the private sector. It may operate in highly competitive markets—as, for example, an airline does—or it may hold a monopoly position and so require active regulation once it is transferred to the private sector—as a utility company does. In either case, the public sector is disengaged from the business.
[33] The UN Global Compact was initially launched with the first nine Principles. On 24 June 2004, during the first Global Compact Leaders Summit, Kofi Annan announced the addition of the tenth principle against corruption in accordance with the United Nations Convention Against Corruption adopted in 2003United Nations Global Compact. (2023, November 12). Wikipedia. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Nations_Global_Compact
[34] This new edition of Paul Wilkinson’s Terrorism Versus Democracy examines the major trends in international terrorism and the liberal democratic response.https://philarchive.org/archive/NEAGWO Drawing key lessons from the recent experience of democracies, and in par-ticular from the response of the US and UK to the events of 9/11, the author has revised existing chapters and added new ones in order to offer a candid interim balance sheet on the success and failures of the ‘War on Terror’
[35] Louise Richardson also sees political measures as a significant policy option for countering terrorist organizations and argues this theory in Democracy and Counterterrorism: Lessons from the Past. https://dsc.duq.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1754&context=etd She believes negotiations between the
government and terrorist organizations can arrive at compromises and concessions for the sake of ending resistance, and bring about socioeconomic and political reforms. This is effective with the organization and reaches the targeted open society.
[36] https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA436240.pdf dynamics of insurgency and counterinsurgency (COIN)
operations citing David Galula’s theory. In his book, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice, Galula sets a clear mark for planning future COIN operations against the increased likelihood of insurgencies following an Orthodox Pattern in semi-authoritarian countries.
[37] https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA186545.pdf The first real effort to deal with international
terrorism by an international forum did not take place until the 1930’s. On 9 October 1934, King Alexander of
Yugoslavia and French Foreign Minister Louis Barthou were assassinated in Marseilles, France. The government of France immediately proposed that an international criminal court be established to prosecute “terrorist criminals”
[38] https://www.unodc.org/documents/e4j/18-04932_CT_Mod_01_ebook_FINALpdf.pdf Article 1(2)
of the Terrorism Convention defines “acts of terrorism” as “criminal acts directed against a
state” (1937). Such acts must be “intended or calculated to create a state of terror in the minds of particular persons, or a group of persons or the general public”. Nonetheless, State and regional traditions of asylum, coupled with strong national sympathies, made any differentiation between “terrorist” and “political” offences problematic, and the granting of asylum remained possible then, as now. Moreover, the 1937 Terrorism Convention, as a creature of its time, had no “international” criminal law to be grounded in, as reflected in
article 19
[39] https://legal.un.org/ilc/documentation/english/a_cn4_571.pdf The formula “extradite or prosecute” (in Latin: aut dedere aut judicare) is commonly used to designate the alternative obligation concerning the treatment of an alleged offender, “which is contained in a number of multilateral treaties aimed at securing international co- operation in the suppression of certain kinds of criminal conduct”
[40] https://www.nurembergacademy.org/about-us/history/ In 1950, Principles of International Law Recognized in the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal and in the Judgment of the Tribunal were formulated by the International Law Commission and submitted to the General Assembly of the United Nations. With these Principles, the concepts of individual criminal accountability for crimes under international law, end to impunity, equality before the law, fair trial rights were universally recognized. Moreover, the crimes against peace, war crimes and crimes against humanity were defined.
[41] https://legal.un.org/ilc/summaries/7_4.shtml Draft Code of Offences (1954) The task of preparing a draft code of offences against the peace and security of mankind was entrusted to the Commission in 1947, by General Assembly resolution 177 (II) of 21 November 1947, the same resolution that requested it to formulate the Nürnberg principles. The Commission began its consideration of the draft code of offences at its first session, in 1949, when the Commission appointed Jean Spiropoulos as Special Rapporteur for the subject. It proceeded with its work at its third, fifth and sixth sessions, in 1951, 1953 and 1954, respectively. In connection with its work on the draft code of offences, the Commission had before it the reports of the Special Rapporteur
[42] https://legal.un.org/ilc/summaries/7_4.shtml The Nürnberg Tribunal had stated in its judgment that: “Crimes against international law are committed by men, not by abstract entities, and only by punishing individuals who commit such crimes can the provisions of international law be enforced.”6 Thus, offences enumerated in the draft Code were characterized as “crimes under international law, for which the responsible individuals shall be punishable”.
[43] https://legal.un.org/avl/ha/cppcipp/cppcipp.html The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents (also referred to as the “Protection of Diplomats Convention”) was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 14 December 1973. It is one of a series of “sectoral” anti-terrorism conventions negotiated within the United Nations and its specialised agencies. It built on the great codification conventions in the field of privileges and immunities, including the Vienna Conventions on Diplomatic and Consular Relations.
[44] https://www.un.org/law/cod/finterr.htm International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism. (n.d.). https://www.un.org/law/cod/finterr.htm
[45] Refworld | Cambodia: Information on Cambodian Freedom Fighters (CFF). (n.d.). Refworld. https://www.refworld.org/docid/3f51e6f94.html The CFF made headlines in November 2000 when it claimed responsibility for a nighttime raid on several Government facilities in Phnom Penh in which 8 people were killed and 14 others injured (Jane’s 30 Jan 2002; U.S. DOS 21 May 2002). Prior to the November 2000 attacks, five CFF members were arrested in April 1999 for plotting to blow up a fuel depot outside Phnom Penh with anti-tank weapons (U.S. DOS 21 May 2002). Since then, Cambodian courts have jailed several dozen people for their roles in the attacks in trials that have been widely criticized as unfair
[46] https://usoas.usmission.gov/our-relationship/policy-programs/hemispheric-security/ OAS members states negotiated text for the Inter-American Convention Against Terrorism in November 2001, in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks The Convention commits state parties to endeavor to become party to 10 international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism (listed in the Convention), consistent with UN Security Council Resolution 1373. The Convention also commits state parties to take certain measures to prevent, combat, and eradicate the financing of terrorism and to deny safe haven to suspected terrorists.
[47] Use of Chemical, Biological Weapons Unacceptable in Any Context, Delegates Stress, as First Committee Continues General Debate | UN Press. (2021, October 7). https://press.un.org/en/2021/gadis3666.doc.htm Members reaffirmed their intention to organize a dedicated side event at the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference and expressed their desire to pursue exchanges on that issue, he noted, saying the P5 also supports negotiation of a fissile material cut-off treaty in the Conference on Disarmament. He said the group is currently finalizing the second edition of the glossary of key nuclear terms, which can help to enhance mutual understanding of related policies. Reaffirming support for the objectives of the Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone, known as the Treaty of Bangkok, he said the P5 is available to deepen exchanges with the member States of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in that regard. Regarding the peaceful use of nuclear energy, he stressed that the group remains engaged in broadening access to related technologies and in supporting the role of that resource in the energy transition, he said, adding that efforts are under way to prepare joint P5 deliverables for the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference. Underlining the P5’s special responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, he said that in light of the tense global security context, the pursuit and strengthening of dialogue ‑ among P5 members as well as between the nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon nations ‑ is key to strategic stability.
[48]https://unidir.org/files/publication/pdfs/implementing-resolution-1540-the-role-of-regional-organizations-339.pdf For example the only biosecurity legislation that Malaysia has in place appears to be the
Poisons Act of 1952, the Prevention and Control of Infectious Disease Act of 1988 and the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1994, none of which specifically address the threat of bioterrorism. In recognition of the inadequacy of this legislation Malaysia is in the process of “studying the need
to draft a specific law to implement more effectively the [BTWC]”
[49] 1540 Committee | About 1540 Committee | General Information. (n.d.). https://www.un.org/en/sc/1540/about-1540-committee/general-information.shtml The resolution affirms support for the multilateral treaties whose aim is to eliminate or prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the importance for all States to implement them fully; it reiterates that none of the obligations in resolution 1540 (2004) shall conflict with or alter the rights and obligations of States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Chemical Weapons Convention, or the Biological Weapons Convention or alter the responsibilities of the IAEA and OPCW.
[50] Edwards, B., Novossiolova, T., Crowley, M., Whitby, S. M., Dando, M., & Liu, S. (2022, April 26). Meeting the Challenges of Chemical and Biological Weapons: Strengthening the Chemical and Biological Disarmament and Non-proliferation Regimes. Frontiers in Political Science. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpos.2022.805426
[51] https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/16/12/legalframeworkforsafeguards.pdf In 1974, the Secretariat developed the text of a protocol available to States which concluded a comprehensive safeguards agreement and had little or no nuclear material and activities (referred to as ‘small quantities protocols’ (SQPs)
[52] https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/16/12/legalframeworkforsafeguards.pdf IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) inspectors are entitled to certain privileges and immunities while they are carrying out their safeguards responsibilities in the fi eld. These are grounded in Article XV.B of the IAEA Statute, which provides that the staff of the IAEA shall enjoy “such privileges and immunities as are necessary in the independent exercise of their functions in connexion with the Agency”
[53] https://www.nas.gov.sg/archivesonline/data/pdfdoc/20050926987.htm Singapore has joined more than 100 countries in being a signatory to the Additional Protocol (see Note 1) to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement. The Additional Protocol between Singapore and the IAEA was signed on 22 September 2005 at the IAEA Headquarters in Vienna. Mr Burhan Gafoor, Permanent Representative of Singapore in Geneva and Governor on the IAEA Board of Governors, signed the document on behalf of Singapore, and Mr Mohamed El Baradei, Director-General of the IAEA, signed on behalf of the IAEA.
[54] The entry into force of the CPPNM in 1987 and its Amendment in May 2016 were crucial milestones in the development of the international legal framework for nuclear security, as they remain the only internationally legally binding undertakings in the area of physical protection of nuclear material and of nuclear facilities used for peaceful purposes.https://www.iaea.org/publications/documents/conventions/convention-physical-protection-nuclear-material-and-its-amendment
[55] OAS – Inter-American Committee against Terrorism (CICTE) – Cybil Portal. (2022, December 22). Cybil Portal. https://cybilportal.org/actors/inter-american-committee-against-terrorism/ CICTE is the Inter-American Committee against Terrorism. It is the only regional entity whose purpose is to prevent and combat terrorism in the Americas. CICTE promotes cooperation and dialogue among member states to counteract terrorism, in accordance with the principles of the OAS Charter, with the Inter-American Convention against Terrorism, and with full respect for the sovereignty of countries, the rule of law and international law.
[56] The National Security Strategy of the United States of America. (2003, April 29). https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/nsc/nssall.html the government of USA contends that: “Parts of Latin America confront regional conflict, especially arising from the violence of drug cartels and their accomplices. This conflict and unrestrained narcotics trafficking could imperil the health and security of the United States. Therefore we have developed an active strategy to help the Andean nations adjust their economies, enforce their laws, defeat terrorist organizations, and cut off the supply of drugs, while—as important—we work to reduce the demand for drugs in our own country”.
[57] Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay join to increase resilience of tri-border region. (2018, May 22). https://www.preventionweb.net/news/argentina-brazil-and-paraguay-join-increase-resilience-tri-border-region
[58] – THREAT TO THE HOMELAND: IRAN’S EXTENDING INFLUENCE IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE. (n.d.). https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-113hhrg85689/html/CHRG-113hhrg85689.htm Together, these two Argentine Muslim-converts are extending Iran’s influence in Latin America by propagating additional mosque’s and Islamic cultural centers, and performing the exact same type of intelligence, information, and influence operations that Abdul Kadir carried out in Guyana, and their mentor, Mohsen Rabbani successfully implemented in Argentina. The abuse of Free Trade Zones (FTZ) and emergence of a New Tri-Border Area (TBA) Many of the Islamic organizations and native Muslim-converts working on behalf of the Iranian regime are operating within Free Trade Zones (FTZ) in Latin America.
[59]UNTC. (n.d.). https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XIX-46&chapter=19&clang=_en
[60] United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy | Office of Counter-Terrorism. (n.d.). https://www.un.org/counterterrorism/un-global-counter-terrorism-strategyThe Strategy reaffirms that Member States have the primary responsibility to implement the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy and in preventing and countering terrorism and violent extremism conducive to terrorism. It sends a clear message that terrorism is unacceptable in all its forms and manifestations, and that Member States have resolved to take practical steps, individually and collectively, to prevent and combat terrorism. Those practical steps include a wide array of measures ranging from strengthening Member States’ capacity to counter terrorist threats to better coordinating the United Nations System’s counter-terrorism architecture and activities.
[61] https://legal.un.org/ilc/summaries/7_4.shtml
[62] http://resources.library.leeds.ac.uk/final-chapter/dissertations/law/example2.pdf refer (Pg No. 11)
[63] Measures to eliminate international terrorism – Sixty-ninth session – Sixth Committee (Legal) – UN General Assembly. (n.d.). https://www.un.org/en/ga/sixth/69/int_terrorism.shtml
[64] Rashid, N. M. (2009, October 28). Security Council resolution 1566 (2004) on Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts – United Nations and the Rule of Law. United Nations and the Rule of Law. https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/blog/document/security-council-resolution-1566-2004-on-threats-to-international-peace-and-security-caused-by-terrorist-acts/
[65] UNTC. (n.d.). https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetailsIII.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XVIII-15&chapter=18&Temp=mtdsg3&clang=_en
[66] https://legal.un.org/committees/terrorism/In 1996 the General Assembly, in resolution 51/210 of 17 December, decided to establish an Ad Hoc Committee to elaborate an international convention for the suppression of terrorist bombings and, subsequently, an international convention for the suppression of acts of nuclear terrorism, to supplement related existing international instruments, and thereafter to address means of further developing a comprehensive legal framework of conventions dealing with international terrorism. This mandate has continued to be revised and renewed on an annual basis by the General Assembly in its resolutions on the agenda item “Measures to eliminate international terrorism”.
[67] Measures to eliminate international terrorism – Sixty-ninth session – Sixth Committee (Legal) – UN General Assembly. (n.d.). https://www.un.org/en/ga/sixth/69/int_terrorism.shtml
[68] Scopic Regime Change: The War of Terror, Visual Culture, and Art Education on JSTOR. (n.d.). www.jstor.org. https://www.jstor.org/stable/24467877
[69] https://scholars.unh.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3501&context=dissertation see Pg No: (06)
[70] Special Report: A Review of the FBI’s Handling of Intelligence Information Prior to the September 11 Attacks. (n.d.). https://oig.justice.gov/sites/default/files/archive/special/0506/chapter5.htm
[71] https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/documents/CRPT-107srpt351-5.pdf https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/documents/CRPT-107srpt351-5.pdf
[72] One problem posed by the Second Circuit’s analysis is that claims against Saudi Arabia could not “properly be brought” under any other exception to the FSIA because Saudi Arabia is not on the list of “4state sponsors of terrorism.”https://scholar.smu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1451&context=lbra
[73] https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/documents/CRPT-107srpt351-5.pdf Christensen, D. (2023, June 24). Victims’ lawsuit that seeks to hold Saudi Arabia accountable for 9/11 approaches make-or-break crossroads. Florida Bulldog. https://www.floridabulldog.org/2023/06/victims-9-11-lawsuit-vs-saudi-arabia-nears-critical-crossroads/
The kingdom’s Washington, D.C. lawyers recently declared in court documents that by Oct. 6 they will ask the presiding federal judge to dismiss the New York litigation against them in its entirety, asserting that a U.S. court lacks jurisdiction to hear the multi-billion-dollar case because Saudi Arabia is immune from a lawsuit under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA).
[74] http://classic.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/UQLawJl/2001/6.pdfIn 1988 Pan Am flight 103 exploded over Lockerbie, Scotland killing all 243 passengers and 16 crew on board as well as 11 residents on the ground below. This horrific air disaster was made more so because the killings were deliberate.’ After years of piecing together the wreckage of PA103, in November 1991 the governments of the United States2
and the United ~ i n ~ d o m ~issued indictments accusing two Libyans of introducing an explosive device into the plane which caused it to explode. The Libyans were initially charged with murder, conspiracy to murder, and contravention of the Aviation Sec~irityAct 1982.
[75] Garg, R. (2022, June 13). Extradition in International Law – iPleaders. iPleaders. https://blog.ipleaders.in/extradition-in-international-law/#What_is_extradition
Terlinden v. Ames, 184 U.S. 270 (1902) “extradition is the surrender by one nation to another of an individual accused or convicted of an offence outside of its own territory and within the territorial jurisdiction of the other which, being competent to try and punish him demands the surrender”.
[76] https://treaties.un.org/doc/db/terrorism/conv3-english.pdf The offence established by the Hague Convention requires the seizure of, or
other exercise of control over, an aircraft in flight, or an attempt to do so. It can be committed only by a person on board the aircraft. Similarly, the conduct of an accomplice must also take place on board. These limitations restrict the scope of the offence. In particular they exclude from its ambit cases where force is applied from outside the aircraft. Moreover, the offence under the Hague Convention does not extend to acts of sabotage and destruction of aircraft. Unhappily, such conduct has occurred frequently. Between 1949 and 1970, 22 aircraft were destroyed and over 400 persons killed as a result of the detonation of explosives on board. A further treaty was therefore needed to co-ordinate means for the deterrence and punishment
of such acts.
[77] https://www.unodc.org/pdf/model_treaty_extradition_revised_manual.pdf On recommendation of the Eighth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and Treatment of Offenders, the Model Treaty was adopted by the General Assembly in resolution 45/116 of 14 December 1990. Subsequently, in 1995, in order to ensure that the Model Treaty continues to reflect the most recent trends in extradition practice, the Ninth United Nations Congress recommended to the Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice to convene an intergovernmental expert group to explore ways to increase the efficiency of extradition and related mechanisms of international cooperation in criminal matters. This recommendation was endorsed in ECOSOC resolution 1995/27, of 24 July 1995, in which the Secretary General was requested to convene an expert group for this purpose.